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ABSTRACT
The Niger Delta region, which is the hydrocarbon basket of Nigeria, appears to be sitting on an environmental time bomb due to degradation from 
widespread hydrocarbon pollution. The major sources of environmental degradation in the Niger Delta are oil spillage, gas flaring and improper 
disposal of wastes from oil drilling operations. Presently, it is estimated that there are over 5,000 massively polluted sites in the Niger Delta. Drawing 
data from secondary sources, this paper finds that despite the enormity of environmental pollution and its deleterious effects on the socio-economic 
wellbeing of the Niger Delta region, there is no implementable blueprint or policy for remediation. The paper links the economic cost of environmental 
pollution to the pervasive poverty and other socio-ecological crises that envelope the region in a smoke of underdevelopment. The paper therefore 
advocates a clear national remediation policy to sustainably deal with the degraded environment of the region.
Keywords: Environmental Degradation, Hydrocarbon Pollution, Remediation Policy 
JEL Classifications: O13, P48, Q35, Q52, Q56
1. INTRODUCTION
Hydrocarbons are seemingly indispensable in maintaining and 
advancing contemporary civilization and industrialization. At 
the apex of the scale of importance and indispensability among 
hydrocarbons are oil and gas. As Kesler and Simon (2015. p. 144) 
have pointed out, “the list of products made from oil is virtually 
endless, and includes far more than fuel used for transportation.” 
Oil production negativities such as gas flaring, oil spillage and toxic 
pollutants have combined to distort the Niger Delta ecosystem. The 
distortion manifests in ravaged swamps and mangroves, polluted 
creeks, rivers and rivulets and scorched farmlands. The resultant 
effect of this has been the erosion of people’s means of livelihood 
in the region resulting in high incidence of poverty (UNDP, 2006; 
Amnesty International, 2009; Pegg and Zabbey, 2013; Elum et al., 
2016). Many analysts might argue that the establishment of such 
specialized agencies as the Niger Delta Development Commission 
(NDDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs is a demonstration 
of the commitment of the government to address the challenges 
confronting the region. But the core tasks of these institutions 
seem to revolve around midwifing infrastructural development 
as well as resolving the backlog of infrastructural development 
deficits spawned by commercial oil exploitation since 1956. In 
other words, the preponderance of the attempts by the Nigerian 
state to address the Niger Delta crises had been more on physical 
development than on the sustainability of the ecosystem.
The greatest challenge in the Niger Delta is not just planting 
physical and social infrastructures or making its characteristically 
difficult and inaccessible terrains accessible but the repair of 
the ecological devastation wrought by oil production activities. 
Considering that about 5,284 oil wells are scattered all over the 
Niger Delta region with thousands of kilometres of oil and gas 
pipelines, it means that there are equivalent number of locations 
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from which oil spills, gas flaring and pollution from chemical and 
toxic wastes could occur to jeopardize the ecosystem (Evoh, 2002; 
Steiner, 2010; Eke, 2016).
There is the tendency in the Nigerian state to share the “national 
cake” that is, oil revenue, without any modicum of responsibility 
towards its baking and tending the environment (Ayu, 1994; 
Ikpeze et al., 2004). Although Nigeria’s exact earning from crude 
oil since its discovery in commercial quantity in 1956 is a subject 
of speculation, it is estimated that between 1960 and 2009, the 
country netted over US$600 billion (Amnesty International, 2009; 
Ndiribe, 2014). However, available data from the Nigeria’s audited 
account showed that it generated US$ 148.8 billion between 
2006 and 2008 and US$143.5 billion between 2009 and 2011 
respectively (Udo, 2013). More recent estimates have put Nigeria’s 
cumulative earnings since the 1970s in the neighbourhood of 
US$1 trillion (). For every dollar that is earned from oil there is a 
calculable percentage of environmental damage associated with 
it, which can be worked out and deployed for its sustainability.
Apart from the 13% derivation and the various bureaucratic 
institutions set up to drive and accelerate development in the 
Niger Delta region, there is no modality incorporating other parts 
of Nigeria in sharing the risks associated with oil production 
activities. The precariousness of the Niger Delta ecosystem is such 
that unless a systematic repair is embarked upon immediately, 
the combined effects of gas flares, oil spills, toxic and hazardous 
chemicals pollution and fallouts would undermine the economic 
potentials of Niger Delta and render its future generations 
environmental refugees. The first scientific study of the impact 
of oil production on Niger Delta carried out by the United Nation 
Environment Programme (UNEP) revealed that it would cost 
US$1 billion and take up to 30 years to clean up only Ogoniland 
in the region (UNEP, 2011). Thus, if oil should cease to be an 
important international commodity, the Niger Delta, on account of 
its devastated ecosystem, would be a mere relic of a glorious past.
2. PROBLEMATIZING HYDROCARBON 
POLLUTION AND SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL 
FALLOUTS
With the continuous exploitation of oil in the Niger Delta region 
since 1956, its ecosystem has had to contend with distortions as 
a result of the negative effects of oil production. The Niger Delta 
is a rich ecosystem located in the southernmost part of Nigeria 
and covers an area that is approximately 70,000 km². Apart from 
its reputation as Africa’s largest wetland, it is also considered as 
one of the most important wetland and marine ecosystems in the 
world (Obi, 2010; Denedo et al., 2017). The rich ecosystem of 
the Niger Delta comprises mangrove forests, swamps, coastal 
ridges, and forests which provide a vast biodiversity that supports 
a wide array of flora and fauna as well as high population density 
of people (Obi, 2010; UNEP, 2011).
However, through man-made and system failures in the process of 
oil and gas production as well as “third party interference, mainly 
sabotage, theft of equipment or leaks caused by thieves drilling 
into pipelines or opening up wellheads to steal oil”, the capacity 
of the Niger Delta environment to sustain farming, hunting and 
fishing which are the traditional economic mainstay of the region 
has been irretrievably impaired (Shell Petroleum Development 
Company, 2011. p. 1).
There appears to be an inverse relationship between the fortunes 
of the people and oil exploitation: The more oil is extracted 
(especially in deference to OPEC quota), the more the Niger Delta 
environment suffers degradation with the attendant pauperization 
of the people (UNDP, 2006; Ibeanu, 2008a). The Niger Delta 
paradox has been possible for a number of reasons: First, the 
injustice and insensitivity that characterize Nigeria’s federal 
system as exemplified by skewed revenue distribution framework; 
second, the retrogressive laws which have denied the Niger Delta 
region a voice in oil production activities such as the Petroleum 
Act of 1968 and 1991, Exclusive Economic Zone Act of 1978; 
Associated Gas Re-injection Act of 1979; the National Waterways 
Decree of 1997 and the Land Use Act of 1978 and 1993; third, the 
loss of income-earning opportunities as a result of environmental 
degradation and pollution of land and rivers in the region (Ibeanu, 
2008b; Ekpebu, 2008; Omagu, 2011; Edu, 2011; Elum et al., 2016). 
And fourth, the double standard in the operations of international 
oil corporations (IOCs) as exemplified by non-adoption of 
international best practices in their operations in Nigeria. Thus, the 
effect has been the destruction of the environment and exacerbation 
of misery and poverty among the people (Okonta and Douglas 
2003; UNDP, 2006).
The distortion of the Niger Delta environment is located in the 
various forms of pollution associated with oil refining, spillage, 
gas flaring and pipeline explosions. Oil spills and gas flares spew 
out chemicals that negatively affect the integrity of the soil and 
the rivers thereby causing stunting of crops and destruction of 
aquatic life as well as constituting serious threat to human beings. 
Ibeanu (2008b) affirms that refinery effluents constantly discharged 
into fresh water and farmlands contain metals (such as cadmium, 
chromium, mercury and lead) which, at high concentrations, 
cause metabolic malfunctions in human beings. The Nigerian 
government was nonchalant about the ecological challenges in 
the Niger Delta until 1983 when the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) recognized and accepted that environmental 
problems in the Niger Delta, such as stunted mangrove forest, arid 
and sterile land and corrosion from acid rain and other pollutants, 
were caused by the activities of oil companies operating in the 
area (ANEEJ, 2004; Omagu, 2011).
In addition to the direct threats to the ecosystem as a result of oil 
exploitation, there is also threat from oil pipelines. The Niger Delta 
region is a maze of pipes criss-crossing the entire region and which 
were designed to serve dual purposes: The lifting of crude oil and 
transportation of refined products to designated depots. From eleven 
kilometres of pipelines in 1955 to convey crude oil from Oloibiri 
oil field to Kugbo Bay, the network of pipelines in the Niger Delta 
has grown to cover several thousands of kilometres with Shell 
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) alone maintaining a 
network of more than 6,000 kilometres of flowlines and pipelines 
in the Niger Delta (Kupolokun, 2004; Anifowose et al., 2014).
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These pipelines have contributed to the serious ecological crises 
in the Niger Delta owing essentially to compromised enforcement 
regime. In the first instance, environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) was not carried out prior to the installation of most of these 
pipelines to determine their long-term effects on the environment. In 
other words, there was no systematized guideline that undergirded 
their installation as EIA came into effect in 1992. The incessant 
spillages and pipeline explosions that have claimed thousands of 
lives attest to this arbitrariness. Secondly, the sizes of these pipelines 
which range from 6 to 24 inches in diameter and their networks 
which criss-cross the Niger Delta region have triple effect on the 
ecology: One, the embedment of these pipes three feet into the soil 
along a 3.5 m right of way further diminishes available land for 
agricultural and developmental purposes; two, there are bound to 
be seepages into the soil arising from both leaks in the pipes and 
corrosion. In 2016, cases of either ruptured or vandalized pipelines 
summed up to 2589 (NNPC, 2016). And three, these pipelines 
lead to deforestation and destruction of wildlife as a result of the 
constant need to access and keep them in proper working condition.
The socio-ecological realities of the Niger Delta are encapsulated 
in the paradox of scarcity in plenty. Despite enormous earnings 
from oil, the Niger Delta is mired in poverty, unemployment and 
conflicts principally because of the destruction of its environment. 
The destruction of the Niger Delta ecosystem created occupational 
dislocation that spawned feelings of deprivation and subsequent 
violence in the region (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2012; Ezirim, 2018). 
These feelings were exacerbated by the absence of state-sponsored 
contingency programme to cushion the fallouts from the 
dislocation. This failure of the state taxed the region to the extreme 
and exposed the youth to certain interests who had other agenda 
outside their advertised goal of group or ethnic emancipation.
3. MANIFESTATIONS, TRENDS AND EFFECTS 
OF HYDROCARBON POLLUTION
Since the discovery of oil in commercial quantities at Oloibiri in 
1956 and subsequent commencement of oil exploitation, the volume 
of oil production had risen astronomically from 5100 to 2.5 million 
barrels per day (bpd) (Steyn, 2009; Duru, 2014). Since 1999, except 
for the period between 2004 and 2009 when the Niger Delta militants 
disrupted oil production, Nigeria has produced an average of between 
2.1 and 2.5 million barrels per day (mpd) (CBN, 2009; NNPC, 2012). 
However, oil and gas production has come at a great cost to the 
environment with multiplier effects on the people. The pollution of 
the Niger Delta environment, with its serious negative implications 
on its ecosystem, is a product of two interrelated failures: One, state 
failure rooted in lack of political will on the part of regulatory agencies 
to enthrone international best practices in oil production activities 
as well as corruption; and two, institutional failure manifesting in 
arbitrariness and double standard in the operations of the IOCs, 
Hydrocarbon pollution manifests in several forms, namely.
3.1. Pollution from Oil Spillage and Pipeline Explosion
Oil spillage as a result of exploration, exploitation and transportation 
is a major source of environmental degradation in the Niger Delta. 
It does not matter whether the spill is of minor, medium, major 
or disaster proportions, oil spills generally have serious negative 
effects on the environment. The cumulative effect of oil spill in 
the Niger Delta is essentially the degradation of its terrestrial and 
marine ecosystem with associated distortion of the environment 
as well as livelihood patterns of the people. Since the inception 
of oil exploitation in the Niger Delta, records of oil spill incidents 
are estimated at over 10,000 spills (Anejionu et al., 2015). It is 
estimated that between 5,724 and 6,800 spills occurred in the Niger 
Delta between 1976 and 2001 (Nwilo and Badejo, 2001; Amnesty 
International, 2009). Also, between 1998 and 2009, Shell reported 
that a total of 491,627 barrels of oil were spilled in its operations 
through a mix of sabotage and operational inefficiency. The Shell 
data translated to 250 spills a year with 1,966.51 barrels of oil in 
each spill. Many scholars considered the posted figures of oil spill 
as underreported (Steiner, 2010; Purefoy, 2010). Studies have 
contended that estimates of the quantities of oil spilled in the course 
of oil exploitation in the Niger Delta range between 9 and 13 million 
barrels (Nwilo and Badejo, 2007; Onuoha, 2008; Ibeanu, 2008b).
The problem associated with available data on oil spill is two-
fold: Underreporting, and the tendency of the NNPC to rely on 
data presented by the IOCs. Such data often blame third party 
interference for oil spills. For instance, Shell claimed that 75% of 
oil spill incidents and more than 70% of all oil spilled, especially 
between 2006 and 2010 were traceable to third party interference 
(SPDC, 2011). This is despite the evidence that such factors as 
mechanical failure, corrosion, operational error, natural hazard and 
unknown causes constitute major sources of oil spill (Ordinioha 
and Brisibe, 2013). Table 1 presents pipeline incidences between 
2012 and 2016 showing fluctuating trends in the vandalization of 
pipelines. The tendency of IOCs to blame third party activities for 
oil spills is challenged by two interrelated factors: One, most of 
the oil pipes are, by international standards, obsolete, having been 
in continuous usage for 20–25 years contrary to internationally 
stipulated 15–20 years life span for oil pipes. Two, some of these 
pipes are not only corroded but were laid above ground level without 
adequate surveillance, thus exposing them to wear and tear and other 
dangers (Oyem cited in Badejo and Nwilo, 2004). Flowing from 
this, Nwilo and Badejo (2007) contend that only 28% of oil spill 
could actually be attributed to sabotage. Recently, Shell accepted 
culpability for the 2008 and 2009 oil spills in Bodo community in 
Rivers State and agreed to compensate the community with £55 
million in the ratio of £35 million for individual members of Bodo 
community and £20 million for the community as an entity (Vidal, 
2015). Nigeria’s national oil spill detection and response agency 
(NOSDRA) asserted that between 2014 and 2015, the Niger delta 
region witnessed about 1,879 cases of oil spills only 64 of the spill 
cases cleaned up (Kalejaye, 2015). Thus, the region has over 5,000 
massively polluted sites (Chukwu, 2018).
Table 1: 5-year pipeline incidences
Year Vandalization Rupture
2012 2,230 26
2013 3,505 65
2014 3,700 32
2015 2,783 49
2016 2,534 55
Source: NNPC, 2016. p. 24
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3.2. Pollution from Hazardous Chemicals and Toxic 
Waste Disposal
The Niger Delta environment is saturated with hazardous and 
toxic chemicals that have far-reaching effects on humans and the 
environment. Ibeanu (2008b. p. 104) observes that high concentrations 
of metals in refining effluents known to cause metabolic malfunction 
in human beings, such as cadmium, chromium, mercury and lead, 
are constantly discharged into fresh water or farmland.
The weak supervisory capability of environmental agencies as a 
result of corruption has exacerbated the environmental degradation 
dilemma. The IOCs have capitalized on this lapse to shroud their 
operations in secrecy. The effects of hazardous and toxic chemicals 
on the Niger Delta environment are enormous considering that 
“the very root of the primary economic base of the region such 
as farmlands, swamps, rivers and ponds have been destroyed” 
leading to resource scarcities (Ikelegbe, 2008. p. 122).
3.3. The Challenge of Gas Flaring and Climate Change
As at 2016, Nigeria’s proven natural gas reserves stood at 
5,475.2 billion standard cubic meter which place it among the 
top 10 in the world (OPEC, 2017). But so far, the country has 
demonstrated acute inefficiency in the exploitation of its gas 
endowments. Even with its low level of gas exploitation, Nigeria 
is known among the world’s most notorious gas flarers (Yar’Adua 
2007; Elvidge et al., 2009). According to OPEC sources, Nigeria 
cumulatively marketed natural gas to the tune of 88,312.4 million 
standard cubic meter between 1970 and 2016 (OPEC, 2017).
Gas flaring connotes the burning off of gas associated with oil 
extraction. When crude oil is extracted from the ground, it is often 
accompanied by large volumes of gas trapped with it. The process 
of separating and purifying crude oil entails that these gases be 
separated from it. The easiest and cheapest way to achieve this is 
by burning it off (Elvidge et al., 2009). Even though this process 
is cheap in the short run, it has proved to be overly expensive in 
the long run as the environment is destroyed. According to the 
World Bank, “flaring gas wastes a valuable energy resource that 
could be used to support economic growth and progress. It also 
contributes to climate change by releasing millions of tons of CO
2
 
to the atmosphere.”1 Evoh (2002); Agbonifo (2016) have attributed 
gas flaring to unsustainable exploration practices and lack of 
gas utilization infrastructure in Nigeria. Gas flaring is a major 
environmental challenge in the Niger Delta, especially in terms 
of the volume of greenhouse gases it emits into the atmosphere. 
The extensiveness of gas flaring is mirrored by the fact that there 
are 178 sites from where about 755 to 800 million standard cubic 
feet of gas are flared daily (Yusuf, 2017). In fact, between 1999 
and 2009, Nigeria emitted 457 million metric tons of greenhouse 
gases, leading the World Bank to accuse the country of contributing 
“more greenhouse gases to the earth’s atmosphere than other 
sources in sub-Saharan African” (Anomohanran, 2012. p. 666). 
Table 2 provides data on gas flare trends between 2011 and 2015. 
From the data, there has been consistent downward trend in gas 
flared as percentage of gas produced.
1 http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/gasflaringreduction#[Last 
accessed on 2018 Jul]
The politics associated with gas flaring has been played to 
the detriment of the Niger Delta with potential disastrous 
consequences. Nigeria first outlawed gas flaring in 1969 and set 
target for 1979. This target failed as those subsequently set for 
1984 and 2003 respectively. The other targets set for 2008, 2009 
and 2010 respectively, by the Nigerian Senate, to end gas flaring 
all failed, which prompted the Senate in 2011 to fix a new date 
of 2015 as the terminal date for gas flaring in Nigeria (Omagu, 
2011). This date was also not realized. Five major reasons could be 
distilled from the failed attempts to achieve zero-flare in the Niger 
Delta. The first reason could be attributed to institutional incapacity 
and lack of political will on the part of regulatory agencies 
(Oloruntoba, 2011). The second reason was the unwillingness 
and non-commitment of the major oil companies especially 
SPDC, ExxonMobil, TotalFinaElf and ChevronTexaco to see to 
the end of gas flare. The third reason was the nonchalance of the 
Nigerian state as demonstrated by its underfunding of joint venture 
agreements. The fourth was the ridiculously low penalties imposed 
on IOCs for gas flaring as well as the corruption that underlies 
the perfunctory implementation of these penalties. In contrast to 
US$ 10 which oil companies are fined in developed countries for 
1000 ft3 of gas flared, the same companies are fined N10/Mscf 
(equivalent to US$$0.03 cents) for the same offence in Nigeria 
(Leadership, 2018). Undoubtedly, this ridiculous penalty motorizes 
the culture of impunity that characterizes the operation of IOCs in 
the Niger Delta as it is cost-effective for them to pay the fine than 
invest in expensive gas-gathering technology. Fifth, and of more 
importance was Nigeria’s economic dependence and mortgaged 
sovereignty as exemplified by the dominance of its oil industry by 
IOCs whose overriding motive is not patriotism but profit (SPDC, 
2004; Aghalino, 2009). There are many issues at stake with regards 
to gas flaring, namely the economic loss to the country, threats to of 
the ecosystem; effects on public health and the sustainability of the 
environment generally. The IOCs have tended to blame everyone 
else but themselves for the non- realization of zero-flare in the 
Niger Delta, often hiding behind such excuses as unavailability 
of appropriate technologies, lack of security in the Niger Delta to 
enable the completion of gas gathering projects and the inability 
of the state-owned NNPC, which owns 55% of the joint ventures, 
to pay its share of the costs (Omagu, 2011; Oloruntoba, 2011).
4. ECONOMIC COST OF 
POLLUTION: TOWARDS ENVIRONMENTAL 
SUSTAINABILITY IN OIL PRODUCING 
AREAS
If oil dries up today or loses its global economic relevance, how would 
the Niger Delta survive in the face of its damaged environment? This 
Table 2: Gas flaring data in percentage
Years Gas utilised as % of gas 
produced
Gas flared as % of gas 
produced
2011 80.4 19.6
2012 77.2 22.8
2013 82.4 17.6
2014 88.5 11.5
2015 88.3 11.7
Source: CBN, 2015. p. 264
Nwozor, et al.: The Political Economy of Hydrocarbon Pollution: Assessing Socio-Ecological Sustainability of Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 9 • Issue 1 • 2019 11
hypothetical question may appear a little far-fetched but it is an attempt 
to profile a post-oil Niger Delta region. We provide two compasses as 
a guide to answering this hypothetical question: First, the destruction 
of the Niger Delta ecosystem which has undermined its capacity 
for sustainable livelihood. And second, the nonchalance attitude of 
successive administrations to deal in any systematic manner, the 
plight of the Niger Delta region as well as the unwillingness of the 
majoritarian ethnic groups to enthrone equitable revenue sharing 
arrangement to compensate for hydrocarbon pollution.
The effect of over sixty years of oil production activities in the 
Niger Delta is the effective underdevelopment of the region. No 
matter how development is conceived, whether as quantitative 
and qualitative improvement in the life of a man or the society 
or as economic progress measured by the growth in per capita 
income and gross national product or as a continuous upward 
movement or improvement in the capacity of the individual and 
society to control and manipulate the forces of nature, available 
evidence raise doubts about development in the Niger Delta. The 
concept of development which this study adopts is the one that 
recognizes man as the epicentre of development. Oni and Bello 
identified four indicators of such development: Ability to satisfy 
the basic needs of man as a result of more income from one’s 
occupation, availability or provision of infrastructural facilities 
like roads, water, electricity; ability to live longer life as a result 
of improvement in health and medical facilities and prevention 
of diseases; ability to read and write and; ability to participate 
meaningfully in political activities and in policymaking at 
government level (cited in Onah 2005. p. 133).
Sustainable development appears a major challenge in the Niger 
Delta because of the piecemeal destruction of the environment and 
the state-regulation of development. UNDP (2006. p. 10) conceives 
sustainable development from people-centric perspective and 
thus, defines it in terms of development “that not only generates 
economic growth but distributes its benefits equitably; that 
regenerates the environment rather than destroys it; that empowers 
people rather than marginalizing them.… [that] gives priority to 
the poor, enlarging their choices and opportunities.” Successive 
regimes have tended to regulate development in the Niger Delta 
by creating ad hoc and interventionist institutions to address the 
multi-variegated complaints of the region (Oluwaniyi, 2008). Until 
recently, with the setting up of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, 
the most popular strategy of the Nigerian state in addressing the 
Niger Delta problem was the setting up of ad hoc institutions hence 
the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) (1960/61); the Niger 
Delta Basin and Rural Development Authority (NDBRDA) (1976); 
the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission 
(OMPADEC) (1992) and NDDC (2000). The verdict on these 
institutions as demonstrated by the lingering development crisis 
in the Niger Delta is that no significant milestones in terms of 
concrete achievements in the area of restoring and renewing the 
Niger Delta environment or stopping further degradation have been 
recorded (Omotola, 2007; Aaron and George, 2010). The Achilles 
heel of these institutions was their relative lack of autonomy and 
complete dependence on the government for funding. All the 
institutions preceding the NDDC failed because corruption, cash 
crunch and politics characterized their operations.
The predilection of the Nigerian state to subscribe to ad hoc institutions 
to address legitimate structural imbalances is antithetical to genuine 
development in a truly federal state. Due to the fact that more emphasis 
is placed on national cake-sharing than its baking, the environmental 
challenges of the Niger Delta never attracted as much policy 
intervention as it should except when oil production is under threat. In 
other words, the strategy of government with respect to environmental 
protection has been patently reactive and “post-mortem.”
Nigeria’s Ecological Fund is inadequate to tackle the environmental 
challenges in the Niger Delta. Indeed, the Niger Delta is far from 
the contemplation of the Ecological Fund. In the 35th Meeting of 
stakeholders on Ecological Fund held in Abuja in 2009, the federal 
government unveiled new guidelines for the distribution of the 
fund, thus: Drought and desertification control receives 60 per 
cent; Soil Erosion, Flood/Gully control receives 25%; Pollution 
control gets 5 per cent while Administration of Ecological 
Fund Office/National Committee on Ecological Problems and 
other emergencies will gulp 10% which will be disbursed at the 
discretion of the President (Suleiman, 2009). No mention was 
made of the ecological disasters caused by oil production and 
exacerbated by the silence and inaction of the Nigerian state.
The economic cost of hydrocarbon pollution in the Niger Delta 
extends to both the state and the people. The state loses enormous 
revenues as a result of pollution both directly and indirectly. It 
is already established that Nigeria flares about 800 mscf of gas 
daily which amounts to a loss of N868 million daily and over 
N633.64 billion annually (Yusuf, 2018). In its environmental 
assessment of Ogoniland, the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) projected that it would take between 25 and 
30 years to clean up Ogoniland but was noncommittal on the 
overall costs of fully restoring the environment. However, UNEP 
recommended a takeoff amount of US$1 billion, while drawing 
attention to the fact that overall restorative costs would depend on 
the remediation standards settled for (UNEP, 2011). The enormity 
of the cost implications of restoring the polluted environment of 
the Niger Delta is underscored by the revelations from NDDC 
sources that Ogoniland harbours about 25% of the over 5,000 
massively polluted sites across the Niger Delta (Chukwu, 2018).
However, the people bear a disproportionate portion of the 
economic cost of hydrocarbon pollution. The cost borne by 
the people is squarely linked to the distortions caused to the 
environment and the untoward reduction in their quality of life 
and general social well-being (UNDP 2006). Thus, the people are 
alienated from their traditional means of livelihoods which imposes 
restrictions on their capacity for wealth creation outside the oil 
economy. Traditionally, the key occupations in the Niger Delta 
range from fishing, hunting, agriculture to forestry. Hydrocarbon 
pollution has undermined these occupations, thus creating and 
exacerbating poverty. As UNDP (2006. p. 7) has observed, there 
are “many intricate links between the environment and sustainable 
livelihoods, demonstrating that environmental degradation and 
poverty are mutually reinforcing.”
Several studies have linked hydrocarbon pollution and attendant 
environmental degradation to the worsening socio-economic 
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conditions of the people. In other words, it exacts and imposes 
very high economic cost on the people. A key part of the economic 
costs is poverty. Although poverty in Nigeria is a national malaise 
which is a reflection of the failure of leadership to leverage on 
the immense wealth generated from oil to chart a sustainable 
development agenda, its manifestation and pervasiveness in the 
Niger Delta is as a result of the exclusion of majority of Niger 
Delta people from the oil wealth generated therein as well as 
the destruction of their environment which robs them of the 
opportunity to generate non-oil wealth. While Nigeria’s 2010 
poverty profile put the proportion of Niger Delta population 
described as ‘food poor’ at 35.5%, current anecdotal evidence 
suggest higher percentage. This is in line with recent data from 
the world poverty clock which put the number of Nigerians living 
in the bracket of extreme poverty at 87 million2.
Beyond poverty, there is also health cost. Various studies have 
linked various ailments to exposure to certain chemicals and 
volatile organic compounds (UNEP, 2011 and UNDP 2006). 
Hydrocarbon pollution in the Niger Delta has contaminated water 
sources and crops, thus exposing the people to various health 
challenges. Ite et al. (2018) have itemized such health challenges 
to include among others genotoxicity, deoxyribonucleic acid 
damage, various forms of cancer, birth defects, leukemia, infertility 
and miscarriages. The worrisome aspect of the health cost is the 
absence of health facilities to deal with health complications.
5. CONCLUSION
The extent of damage to the ecosystem of the Niger Delta is such 
that the traditional means of livelihood have been destabilized. 
Oil production activities have systematically altered the ecological 
make-up of the region through gas flaring, oil spillage, discharge of 
effluents, toxic and hazardous chemicals into the water body and 
attendant environmental pollution. In actuality, years of operations 
of IOCs in the Niger Delta have spilled some nine to thirteen 
million barrels of oil into the environment with millions of tons 
of emissions into the atmosphere. Steiner (2010. p. 4) sums up the 
effect on the Niger Delta environment thus, “throughout 50 years 
of oil production, this ecologically productive region has suffered 
extensive habitat degradation, forest clearing, toxic discharges, 
dredging and filling, and significant alteration by extensive road 
and pipeline construction from the petroleum industry.”
Thus, the Niger Delta environment is no longer sustainable: 
Future generations might not have a fraction of the biodiversity 
which the present generation is enjoying. Therefore there is 
urgent need to embark on a reclamation and remediation task. 
This task is made more urgent by the unfolding socio-economic 
and demographic realities in the region. One, as a result of the 
development of new oil wells, there is a continual contraction in 
its habitable area, thus undermining the possibility creating non-
oil wealth. In other words, there is a serious contention for space 
in its 70,000 km² layout. Secondly, there is a serious challenge 
to occupational stability and continuity as the ecosystem finds it 
increasingly impossible to sustain fishing, farming and hunting, 
2 https://worldpoverty.io/[Last accessed on 2018 Aug].
which are the mainstay of the local population. Thirdly, all these 
challenges are in the face of the burgeoning population, which 
rose from approximately 22.0 million in 1991 to 31.3 million in 
2006 and projected to hit 46 million in 2020 (National Bureau 
of Statistics, 2009; SPDC, 2011). Thus, what is needed for the 
remediation of the Niger Delta environment is the establishment 
of a novel futuristic ecological war chest.
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